Introduction
Over the last decades China has become the main engine of world economic growth. The rapid growth in China was possible due to the country's joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, trade liberalization and high growth of investment in the domestic economy. China's share in world trade increased from about 2.6% in 1993 to about 12.3% in 2015. 1 Currently, however, China's exportled growth model is maturing and the growth of real GDP is slowing. The Chinese economy is slowly rebalancing, meaning that the share of consumption to GDP is increasing and the share of investment to GDP is decreasing (see Zhang, 2016) .
Given the emergence of the Chinese economy as a global force in the world economy, it is not surprising that, recently, much attention of researchers has been directed to the international spillover effects of China's slowdown. The research was intensified in the second half of 2015, when increased volatility in the Chinese stock exchange, coupled with a yuan devaluation, largely affected global financial markets.
The article examines the role of China in the world economy. The aim of the paper is to evaluate the impact of shocks emanating from the Chinese economy on other economies. We concentrate on two possible shocks to Chinese economy, one being a negative demand shock, and the other being a negative stock price shock.
We compare the response of advanced as well as emerging and developing economies. We show that shocks that originate in China translate to the majority of countries in the global economy in a statistically significant way, having the strongest impact on emerging market economies -particularly commodity exporters and other Asian economies. Additionally we show, how the two shocks are transmitted to China's domestic economy. 4 China plays an important role both in traditional global trade and in the global supply chains, processing intermediate goods and re-exporting them to other regions. Therefore for some countries, the direct effects of slowdown in the Chinese economy might be small, whereas the indirect effects, especially through the neighbour countries, might be significant.
High investment in the domestic economy and an ongoing urbanization process in China have caused an increase in Chinese demand for metals. 2 Because of high metal consumption and high oil consumption, China's slowdown may cause large changes in the prices of commodities. Thus, it indirectly affects all commodity exporters, even though they do not trade much with China directly.
The regional impact of China on the Asia-Pacific region should also be taken macroeconomics, they are attractive tool to study spillover effects, for example, Georgiadis (2015a) analyses the impact of the common euro area monetary policy on individual euro area economies, Backé et al. (2013) examine the impact of the euro area shocks on Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, Feldkircher (2015) investigates the impact of foreign shocks on emerging Europe and Georgiadis There are a number of differences between our GVAR model and other research on spillovers from China. One of the most important being the usage of novel data set. The differences concern, for instance, the choice of variables (no long term interest rate is used in our model), the choice of countries and regions, and the time span of data.
The structure of the paper is following. Section 2 contains a literature review.
Section 3 describes the GVAR methodology. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 presents the results, that is the implications of a negative GDP shock in China and the implications of negative equity price shock in China. The last section concludes. There is a number of similar IMF papers that, using the GVAR models, for instance, show how deteriorating the quality of credits to firms and deteriorating banks' balance sheets in China negatively affect the rest of world. commodity exporters, such as Indonesia, and countries that largely depend on exports -Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Thus, the conclusions are similar to Cashin et al. (2016) . The study shows that the negative output shock in China has a negative impact on oil crude prices, metal prices as well as agricultural products prices. We build and estimate a GVAR model using the modified GVAR Toolbox 2.0, which contains necessary procedures in Matlab and a user friendly interface in Excel (see Smith and Galesi, 2014) .
Estimation of the GVAR model is a two-step procedure. Firstly, one estimates small VARX models for each country that are conditional on the rest of world. The country specific models comprise domestic, foreign and optionally global variables or dominant unit variables. The foreign variables are weakly exogenous variables that are constructed as cross-country weighted averages. The global variables may be deterministic and not determined within the model or modelled as dominant unit.
The dominant unit means a dominant player in the global economy, and acts as a dynamic factor in the regressions of the non-dominant units. Secondly, using the spillover matrix, one links individual countries' models into one global VAR model. In the following model we consider N countries. For a particular country � we define the following VARX*(P,R) model: The model can be written in the error correction form:
where � � is a number of cointegrating relations.
We define a vector � �� = � � �� � �� * � that, for a given country, contains its domestic variables and the foreign variables as well. We write: 
Next, by stacking the individual country models, we obtain the global VAR model in domestic variables only:
The � � is known (from estimation of individual country models), we thus multiply both sides of equation (2) by � � �� and we get the GVAR(P) model:
where (3) is solved recursively.
After estimating the GVAR model, generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) are calculated. Because of a large number of variables, it is difficult to use standard impulse response functions that assume orthogonal shocks (see Sims, 1980 ). GIRF were introduced by Koop, Pesaran and Potter in 1996 (see Koop et al. 2006 ). It is important to note that the shape of GIRF does not depend on the ordering of the variables. GIRF may be represented by the following equation:
13 where � ��� is an information set at time � � 1, � ��,�� is the diagonal element of the variance-covariance matrix Σ � corresponding to the l th equation in the j th country and n is the horizon. It appears that on the assumption that � � has a multivariate normal distribution, the GIRFs of a one standard error shock at time t to the l th equation on the i th variable at time t+n is given by the i th element of:
� � is a matrix obtained from moving average representation of equation 3:
and � � = (0,0, … ,1,0, … ,0)′ is a selection vector with unity as the l th element. 
Data
When deciding on the choice of countries, in the first step we take all countries that are included in the BIS effective exchange rate (EER) indices -60 economies plus euro area (broad weights). However, we end up with 55 economies, because we notice that including Algeria, Chinese Taipei, Malta, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela makes the model unstable -it is probably due to low quality of data for these countries.
The chosen economies together cover more than 90% of the global GDP. The euro area countries are grouped into euro area region. 
The chosen economies together cover more than 90% of the global GDP. The euro area countries are grouped into euro area region. In contrast, we build our dataset from scratch. Our dataset is new and was not previously used in any study. Also the choice of variables in our study is different.
Below we present data used in the project. We test the robustness of the results with respect to different combinations of data. We use quarterly observations. We use the Development Indicator database of the World Bank for construction of the country specific PPP-GDP weights.
We complement the data for domestic economies with commodity price index, namely the level of oil prices. The source of these data is IMF Primary Commodity Prices. We use Crude Oil index, which is the simple average of three spot prices: (2014)). We let the data speak for themselves.
In Appendix, Table 2 , we present the lag orders and the number of cointegrating relations of the country specific VARX* models in the baseline model.
Results
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Implications of a negative GDP shock in China
A negative one-standard deviation shock to Chinese GDP, which corresponds to an decrease by 0.32% of Chinese GDP at the time of impact, has statistically and economically significant effects on other economies. The peak response of GDP is after 10 quarters and equals to 0.65% (see Figure 1A) . As a result the global output decreases by 0.07% on impact, and then decreases by maximum of 0.35% after 7 quarters. The effect becomes insignificant from the 11 quarter onwards (see Figure   1B) . In other words, we can easily calculate, that a one percent negative China GDP shock reduces global output by 0.22% in the short run, and then leads to maximum 2% decrease in China GDP and 1% decrease in the global output in the longer term. 
A negative one-standard deviation shock to Chinese GDP, which corresponds to an decrease by 0.32% of Chinese GDP at the time of impact, has statistically and economically significant effects on other economies. The peak response of GDP is after 10 quarters and equals to 0.65% (see Figure 1A) . As a result the global output decreases by 0.07% on impact, and then decreases by maximum of 0.35% after 7 quarters. The effect becomes insignificant from the 11 quarter onwards (see Figure   1B) . In other words, we can easily calculate, that a one percent negative China GDP shock reduces global output by 0.22% in the short run, and then leads to maximum 2% decrease in China GDP and 1% decrease in the global output in the longer term. 20 maximum reaction of E-D economies is equal to about 0.48% after 9 quarters. The result indicates that emerging market economies, seem to be relatively more vulnerable to spillover effects from the Chinese economy. This is with accordance to the literature, for instance, Gauvin and Rebillard (2015) show that the, so-called, hard landing of China's economy, through its impact on the value of export and the value of investment in mining, will decrease the cumulated economic growth within 5 years by 6% in Latin America, by 4.5% in Asian economies and by less than 2% in advanced economies. 26 Figure 5 shows the response of the Chinese economy to one-standard deviation negative shock to GDP in China. As the result of negative demand shock CPI decrease, the maximum reaction of prices is -0,5% after 15 th quarter. CPI decrease steadily from the first quarter onward, but the reaction becomes statistically insignificant from 14 th quarter. Stock prices decrease as well, the maximum reaction being -5% in the 6 th quarter. The reaction is statistically significant until the 9 th quarter. REER appreciates in the short run, and then depreciates, but the reaction is not statistically significant from the 6 th quarter onward.
The reaction of exchange rate seems to be counterintuitive, as one would rather expect the exchange rate to depreciate after the negative demand shock.
China, however, has a strictly controlled currency policy, it regulates trading activity and tries to control daily movements of the yuan on the forex market. China's government has fixed it currency to US dollar (8 yuan to the US dollar) in 1995 and has gradually widen the trading band since 2005. Also the yaun is not fully convertible, meaning that investors who want to buy yaun must do it directly in the China's cental bank. Thus, often interventions of the government in the forex market affect the value of yuan, that is not fully determined by the market forces.
Next, after the negative GDP shock interest rate decreases, and the maximum reaction is -10% after 10 th quarter, but this reaction is not statistically significant. out over 40% of its value (see Figure 6 ). Authorities introduced a number of measures to stop the losses, such as banning large shareholders from selling, outlawing forms of short-selling, chasing down individuals they blamed for manipulating the markets, and a circuit breaker mechanism 4 . As the result of the crash on China stock exchange, large decreases were observed in the international stock markets. This section examines the international spillover effects of the surge in China's stock exchange volatility.
Figure 6. Shanghai Composite Index
We concentrate on the result of decrease in stock prices in China. The negative Chinese stock price shock is presented in Figure 8 . The shock is equal to one standard deviation of Chinese stock prices, that is 5% decrease in stock prices on impact. The shock is temporary and becomes statistically insignificant in three quarters. Figure 7 presents the response of stock indices in the advanced and the emerging and developing economies to negative stock price shock in China. The impulse response function for advanced economies is not statistically significant, that seems to suggest that the decrease in stock prices in China does not have a 4 The breaker mechanism, however, created panic selling and had to be withdrawn.
significant effect on stock markets in these countries. This result is intuitive, because
China has weaker financial than trade linkages with advanced economies, China's capital account is among the most closed in the world, and the access of foreigners to Chinese stock markets and Chinese to foreign stock markets is limited.
Whereas, the reaction for emerging and developing countries is statistically significant for the first two quarters. The maximum reaction of stock prices in E-D economies is 3% on impact and becomes statistically insignificant after two quarters. The intuition behind the result is that China is financially and economically more strongly connected with emerging markets than with advanced economies (yuan payments, Chinese banks loans for infrastructure development) and China is often included in the same basket as other emerging economies (falls in the Chinese stock exchange may automatically lead to falls in other emerging markets stock exchanges, such as Brazil, Russia, or Turkey). 
Robustness of the results
We run many series of robustness checks. Below we report only the most interesting findings.
We test the robustness of the results to different trade matrixes. As a trade matrix we use weighting matrix for broad indices from BIS effective exchange rate statistics as well as we use floating trade matrix based on DOTS statistics instead of the fixed one. In both cases we confirm the result that emerging and developing economies react stronger to China's GDP and stock prices shocks than the advanced economies.
However, for BIS trade matrix we need to reduce the number of cointegrating relations for more than a half of analysed economies to arrive with the stable model. 
Conclusions
The article pays attention to the spillover effects that originate in the Chinese economy. China has emerged as a global economic power, that recently has experienced a slowdown of economic growth and also turbulences in the domestic equity markets. We investigate empirically how negative shocks to China GDP and to China stock prices transmit internationally.
In order to do so we create and estimate the GVAR model that allows to model the economic linkages between a large number of economies. We obtain the results that are intuitive and are in accordance with the presented literature.
We find that a one percent negative China GDP shock reduces global output by 0.22% in the short run, and then leads to maximum 2% decrease in China GDP and 1% decrease in the global output in the longer term. The reaction being weaker in the advanced economies than in the emerging and developing economies. Also the response of real GDP in China to stock prices shock is not statistically significant. This shows that Shanghai Composite index is not a leading economic indicator for real economy in China.
